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TOWARD A MULTIPLE CONSCIOUSNESS OF
LANGUAGE: A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR MARI
MATSUDA
Shannon Gilreath *
The triumph of the S.S. demands that the tortured victim . . . renounce and
abandon himself to the point of ceasing to affirm his identity. . . . They know
that the system which succeeds in destroying its victim before he mounts the
scaffold . . . is incomparably the best for keeping a whole people in slavery.
— David Rousset (former inmate at Buchenwald concentration camp) 1

I am thrilled to be part of this commemoration of the twenty-fifth
anniversary of Professor Matsuda’s influential article Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story. 2 I first read Matsuda’s essay as
a law student when, I must confess, the mind-numbing one-dimensionality
of the law—as one must learn it in the prevailing method—drove me a little
crazy. Law school is an environment where the Socratic method reduces
people’s stories—the stuff of which law is made—to something lawyers like
to call “the facts,” and where real-life people, in whom I saw so much of
myself—people like Michael Hardwick, for example—get completely lost in
the monolith of the law. I was desperate for an alternative. Then came
Matsuda, speaking to me through her writing, telling me: “ ‘No, you are not
crazy, the world looks that way to [me], too.’ “ 3 Neither Matsuda’s method
nor her mind was fettered by supposedly “neutral” legal principles that
amounted to so much sexism and racism and homophobia masquerading as
something lawyers like to call “reasonableness.” I always wanted to ask:

*
Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law; Associate
Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Wake Forest University.
1. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
11–12 (Penguin Books 1994) (1963).
2. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
3. Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989). Matsuda’s work often
acknowledges the work of other “outsider” scholars, including Ann Scales, Richard Delgado,
Catharine MacKinnon, and Derrick Bell, all of whom also helped save my sanity from the
clutches of legal education.
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Reasonable to whom? Certainly not to me. In contrast to the prevailing
discourse about the law, Matsuda was telling us something different:
High talk about language, meaning, sign, process, and law can mask racist
and sexist ugliness if we never stop to ask: “Exactly what are you talking
about and what is the implication of what you are saying for my sister who
is carrying buckets of water up five flights of stairs in a welfare hotel? What
do you propose to do for her today, not in some abstract future you are
creating in your mind?” If you have been made to feel, as I have, that such
inquiry is theoretically unsophisticated, and quaintly naive, resist! 4

I can’t tell you, even now, how much that missive resonated with me,
except to say that it helped keep me sane. Given what Professor Matsuda has
meant to me, then, I could fill much more than the space allotted to me here
praising her and her work. But, within these constraints, I must be content
with reflecting on what Matsuda’s method of multiple consciousness—which
is “a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the
oppressed” 5—means for this country’s positively homicidal stance on socalled free speech, and what hope her method offers.
At the root of the American dream (or delusion) is the notion that
words are constitutive. Anyone well versed in American mythology knows
that Thomas Jefferson—that great plagiarist of Locke who is nevertheless
revered in this country as the brightest of Les Lumières—brought this nation
into being by a declaration in the name of “We the People.” 6 We the People
today know, of course, that Jefferson’s “we” was not as inclusive as it first
appeared. It is worth pausing here to note that at least one founding father,
John Adams, apparently complained that Jefferson told too many tall tales;
and, in any event, Jefferson’s own pen revealed that he meant only that “all
men” were created equal. The fact that these words referred only to white
men was a default position that Jefferson did not bother to qualify, because
he did not need to.
Just a few years shy of the centennial celebration of Jefferson’s
Declaration, no less of an academic powerhouse than Noam Chomsky, a
professional linguist and well-known liberal public intellectual, pondered the
connection between “language and freedom”—a topic that he seemingly did

4. Id. at 9.
5. Id.
6. The exact phrasing “We the People” is, of course, associated with the Constitution,
not the Declaration of Independence. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Jefferson’s “we”—his
collective assertion of the will of the “good people of these colonies”—was the precursor of the
Constitution’s immortal phrase. The Constitution simply made plainer which men did not
count as part of the governing “we” or, indeed, as even fully human—as in, for example, the
three-fifths clause.
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not choose for himself. In a 1970 lecture delivered at Loyola University
Chicago, Chomsky said the following:
When I was invited to speak on the topic “language and freedom,” I was
puzzled and intrigued. Most of my professional life has been devoted to the
study of language. There would be no great difficulty in finding a topic to
discuss in that domain. And there is much to say about the problems of
freedom and liberation as they pose themselves to us and others in the midtwentieth century. What is troublesome in the title of this lecture is the
conjunction. In what way are language and freedom to be interconnected? 7

Chomsky did not resolve the problem. He ended his lecture claiming to be as
“puzzled by the topic” as when he started. 8
I began this essay about Matsuda’s contributions to the study of
language with commentary on Jefferson and Chomsky in order to show why
Matsuda’s work on the subject of language and freedom is so brilliant: it is a
question of point of departure—of radical perspective. Jefferson, today
claimed by conservatives and liberals alike, but, I think, more fairly labeled a
conservative, and Chomsky, an unabashed leftist activist, represent two sides
of the same philosophical liberalism. In America, this liberalism is allencompassing. Both the “conservative” and “liberal” political manifestations
of what Gore Vidal once described as a one-party system have emerged from
it. And this totalizing liberalism serves as the philosophical origin of our
peculiarly American concept of “free speech.” As Matsuda recognizes, “[This
liberalism] allows theorists to discuss liberty, property, and rights . . . with no
connection to what those concepts mean in real people’s lives.” 9 This is the
split consciousness of liberalism to which Matsuda’s radical outsider
scholarship—exemplified by her call for multiple consciousness as legal
method—provides an answer.
I have long thought of free speech, as it has been fictionalized principally
by the liberal Left, as the apogee of liberalism’s split consciousness.
Suppressed in the familiar incantation of “free speech” is the following
question: Free for whom? Speech designed to degrade the equal dignity of a
targeted class, as Matsuda recognizes, is not free at all. “The application of
absolutist free speech principles to hate speech, then, is a choice to burden
one group with a disproportionate share of the costs of speech promotion.” 10

7. Noam Chomsky, Language and Freedom, in N. CHOMSKY, FOR REASONS OF STATE
387 (1970).
8. Id. at 406.
9. Matsuda, supra note 3, at 9.
10. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2376. As Matsuda points out, free speech absolutism—the
belief that all speech must be absolutely protected—is not the law of the First Amendment. But
it is certainly the predominating myth urged on all of us, chiefly as the principal advocacy
position of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), an organization that claims to be
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In this sense, “free speech” is magnificently Orwellian. It means exactly
the opposite of what it says. The literary among us would call this irony. But
when such obfuscation is used to mask a literal brutality, it becomes a
political tool honed to lethal sharpness. This manipulation of language was a
common tactic of the totalitarian state in George Orwell’s 1984. “Ministry of
Love,” for example, actually meant ministry of war. “Joycamp” was, in fact, a
concentration camp. Orwell called this system of reversal “newspeak,” a
state-sanctioned way of speaking that masked real horror.
To this catalogue of newspeak we must surely add American “free
speech.” Free speech, like “We the People,” masquerades as universal and a
priori true when it is, in fact, neither. Matsuda’s particularly lucid
explanation of the free-speech paradox is worth quoting at some length:
The selective consideration of one victim’s story and not another’s results
in unequal application of the law. Unlike the victims of defamation and
other torts, the victims of racist speech are not representative of the
population at large. In making typical legal concessions to the first
amendment, we burden a range of victims. In the case of flag-burning, we
force patriots, veterans, and flag-lovers of all races to tolerate flag
desecration as part of the price of freedom. In contrast, when victims of
racist speech are left to assuage their own wounds, we burden a limited
class: the traditional victims of discrimination. This class already
experiences diminished access to private remedies such as effective
counterspeech, and this diminished access is exacerbated by hate speech.
Debasing speech discredits targets, further reducing their ability to have
their speech taken seriously. . . . The principle of equality is violated by such
allocation. 11

For Matsuda, hate speech, coupled with the state’s active support
(something that, in true newspeak fashion, lawyers call “neutrality”), actually
antisexist and antiracist. (In some cases, it is.). The ACLU presents a classic case of liberal split
consciousness. Matsuda’s method of multiple consciousness, therefore, not only helps us to
understand the law but also the activist organizations that shape it. In contrast to the absolutist
propaganda, the law of the First Amendment actually allows numerous exceptions. Capitalism
overcomes free speech in many ways, id. at 2354, as do multiple interests of the already
powerful, including the need for public order, moral authority (obscenity), defamation, and
privacy, id. at 2354–55.
11. Id. at 2376. Matsuda mentions the lack of effective counterspeech as a private
matter, but its extinction as an operation of law is also highly informative in terms of the
overwhelming antiegalitarian thrust of free-speech doctrine. There used to be a more
egalitarian approach than what now exists. The affirmative action approach to free speech—an
approach that said the speech of those who could afford to monopolize the market, at least in
the broadcast media, had to yield so that others had access (see Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969))—has now been completely destroyed. The Supreme Court has ensured
that corporations and billionaires can buy elections, too, all in the name of free speech. See
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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creates and maintains the inequality of its targets. Of course it does! Isn’t this
the connection between language and freedom that eluded Chomsky? As I
will show, this is, in fact, an old insight. But it took on Matsuda’s part
extraordinary intellectual will to expound. How could it not? Every system of
totalitarianism—including the American system of free-speech absolutism—
depends on obliterating the knowledge of any alternative. As Orwell tells us,
“Newspeak was designed not to extend but to diminish the range of
thought.” 12
Rousseau knew the connection between language and inequality that
Matsuda illumines again by the light of critical race theory. In his Essay on
the Origin of Languages, Rousseau provides this parable:
Upon encountering others, a savage man will at first be afraid. His fright
will make him see those men as taller and stronger than himself. He will
give them the name Giants. After many experiences he will recognize that
as these supposed giants are neither taller nor stronger than himself, their
stature does not agree with the idea that he had first attached to the word
Giant. He will therefore invent another name common to them and to him,
such as the name man for example, and will leave that of Giant for the false
object that had struck him during his illusion. 13

Here, Rousseau describes the creation of inequality in its most literal and
basic sense, 14 as well as discusses the necessary part that language plays in
this process. It is the perfect parable for describing language’s role in creating
hierarchy and inequality, with language policing the boundaries between
good and bad, frightful and familiar.
Rousseau’s parable also exposes the lie of formal equality theory, which
sees problems of inequality only when no legitimate “difference” exists to
warrant unequal treatment. In Rousseau’s narrative, no genuine difference
existed; the only difference was constructed in the mind of primitive man. In
the American system, where equality theory is still almost exclusively
premised on a differences approach, the traditionally marginalized continue
being marginalized because the system refuses to see that the powerful
always control the definition of difference. Hate speech (or anti-identity
speech, as I prefer to call it 15) is essential to a caste system predicated on this
12. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 373 (1st World Lib. 2004) (1949)
(emphasis on “diminish” in original).
13. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of Languages, in THE COLLECTED
WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU 295, 295 (vol. 7) (John T. Scott, trans. 1998).
14. I mean that he did not consider in his explanation the way in which power hierarchy
might prevent “man” from overcoming difference when this same hierarchy in fact depends on
the perpetuation of difference.
15. Shannon Gilreath, “Tell Your Faggot Friend He Owes Me $500 For My Broken
Hand”: Thoughts on a Substantive Equality Theory of Free Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
557, 572 n.63 (2009).
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differences approach because it is a powerful method of policing the
boundaries between the powerful and the powerless (whom the powerful
often propagandize as dangerous). For example, observable anatomical
differences between men and women become sublimated into abstract
differences. 16 These outward differences do not really need to mean
anything, for in fact they may have no genuine significance apart from their
simply existing as observable phenomena; instead, what matters is what they
have been abstracted to mean, i.e., what they have been politicized to mean
for purposes of domination. This is how sexism, racism, and homophobia
work. It is how they become institutionalized. It is not surprising, then, that
feminism and critical race theory have emerged as the primary challengers of
what liberalism has wrought. Liberalism transforms hate speech from a realworld practice into an academic abstraction called “free speech,” making it
nonregulable, and making “freedom of speech” a glove that covers the hand
of dominance in America. On this score, Matsuda brooks no compromise.
She has the guts to say that the American doctrine of free speech is itself
racist. 17
From the perspective of multiple consciousness, the strongest argument
against regulating hate speech—that it is viewpoint based—becomes no
justification whatsoever. An honest look at the First Amendment ineluctably
reveals that it was written by white men who owned slaves and women.
Surely, at least some of them were homosexual, but none dared to say so. To
go back to “We the People” for a moment, these men possessed a freedom of
speech that meant something. An exercise of their declaratory authority
made a nation, at least according to the myth they created; and when this
same We the People decided to create a central government and address
potential worries about possible ways this new government might take away
their rights, they had something that could, theoretically, be taken away. In
other words, the story of the First Amendment is a story of preservation.
Those who had, kept.
Matsuda shows us that the powerless continued to be excluded from We
the People. Is there a point of view here? If so, whose is it? Let’s ask ourselves
again: Where were the women? Where were the African Americans? Where
were the Native Americans? These are the questions Matsuda encourages us
to ask. Whose point of view is the American doctrine of free-speech
16. Derrida, reflecting on Rousseau, gets at this—although while making a point
different from mine—when he notes that what is outwardly discernible is supplanted by that
which is “inward.” See JACQUES DERRIDA, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE 393 (1967).
17. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2351 (“What the American position means in the area of
race is that expressions of ideas of racial inferiority or racial hatred are protected. Anyone who
wants to say that African Americans and Jews are inferior and deserving of persecution is
entitled to.”).
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neutrality tenaciously protecting? And what would it mean if we, as Matsuda
suggests, stopped ignoring the stories of the people who have been excluded
from the beginning? These people, silent, and in no sense part of We the
People, are too often silenced even today. Historically, their legal betters only
had to endure episodic and generally short-lived attempts by the
government they created to abridge a right to speech that everybody agreed
they had; in contrast, the silent ones only got more silence. Matsuda’s theory
of multiple consciousness asks for a breaking of this silence. Significantly,
she also asks that someone finally listen.
Matsuda’s exhortation to consider the victim’s story brings another type
of multiple consciousness to mind: a consciousness of the relationship
between a First Amendment commitment to freedom of speech and a
Fourteenth (and Fifth) Amendment commitment to equality. 18 The
Fourteenth Amendment is aspirational. Its commitment to equality is
forward looking. It gestures toward a society in the making, not one that is
finished. The direction is toward more equality, not less. From this level of
consciousness, the questions begin to look different from those asked when
the First Amendment is viewed as if it were the only value in play. How do
queer baiting and verbal gay bashing contribute to the equality of gays and
lesbians? 19 How does the racist speech of the Ku Klux Klan contribute to the
equality of blacks? How does the speech of the Nazis contribute to the
equality of Jews? How do sexist propaganda and pornography contribute to
the equality of women?
These are the questions that courts still stubbornly refuse to ask, let
alone answer. The Supreme Court’s most recent decisions in this area make
for a dark landscape indeed. 20 Still, Matsuda’s scholarship gives us answers
18. I expound on this connection at length in Gilreath, supra note 15, at 601–14. See also
Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U.
L. REV. 343 (1991) (highlighting how hate speech decreases equality). See generally JEREMY
WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2013).
19. Matsuda has had the strength of character to call this country’s treatment of LGBT
people terrorism. It is particularly significant for me that she didn’t come to this realization
late; she made the statement in 1999. See Mari J. Matsuda, Foreword: Homophobia as
Terrorism, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1999). Alas, it is a realization to which this country’s
leaders still appear blind. See Shannon Gilreath, Why Gays Should Not Serve in the United
States Armed Forces: A Gay Liberationist Statement of Principle, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
LAW 7 (2011) (detailing the ways in which neither U.S. nor international law has
acknowledged homophobic violence as terrorism and how a U.S. foreign policy of military
“intervention” has, in fact, unintentionally promoted homophobic terrorism in many parts of
the world).
20. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011), in which the Court immunized
members of the Westboro Baptist Church against an action predicated on their tortious
disturbance of the funeral of Matthew Snyder, a marine killed in Iraq. Snyder’s father sued
them, in part, for the emotional distress that their picketing caused him; the protesters’
placards included phrases such as, “Fags Doom Nations” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.”
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that may yet be implemented in a legal culture that has too often been the foe
of women, racial minorities, and gays. And she gives us something finer still:
the realization that we are not crazy; that inequality must be resisted, not
simply endured; and that those of us who have taken up the mantle of the
outsider must not give in.

The Court held the church’s conduct untouchable on First Amendment grounds. Only Justice
Alito dissented.

